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INDIANA: BIRTHPLACE OF MIGRATORY DIVORCE
VAL NOLAN, JR.*
It could hardly have been an accident that William Dean Howells, writing
his 1881 novel A Modern Instance, selected Indiana as the state in which
Bartley Hubbard should seek a divorce from his deserted New England wife.'
Eastern lawyers would have seen nothing unrealistic in their fictional breth-
ren's detailed acquaintance with Indiana's divorce law ;' their wives would
have sympathized with the horror that moved one of Howells' ladies to exclaim
against the sordidness of being "a witness in an Indiana divorce case !"3 To
pass from fiction to fact, it could have occasioned no surprise that the first
Supreme Court case testing the faith and credit due a migratory divorce should
concern an Indiana divorce, obtained in 1857.1
Modern considerations of migratory divorce almost neglect to mention the
age of the institution, and few are aware that for some twenty years following
its statutory revision of 1852 Indiana occupied in the national mind the
place now held by Nevada.5 The centripetal force which its easy statutory
causes and lax procedures exerted upon the disappointed spouses of the nation
made Indiana, apparently, the first divorce mill in our history.'
*A.B. 1941, Indiana University; J.D. 1949; Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana
University School of Law.
1. HOWELLS, A MODERN INSTANCE C. XXXVII (Riverside College Classics ed.).
2. Id. at 462.
3. Id. at 475.
4. Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108 (U.S. 1870). The Cheevers had lived together in
Washington, D. C. After separation, Mrs. Cheever went to Indiana and sued her husband
for divorce. He appeared in the Indiana proceedings. In its decree, the Indiana court
ordered Mrs. Cheever to pay one-third of the rents on certain District of Columbia
property to her husband to maintain the children, awarded to him. Defendant collected
rents and claimed them under an assignment from Mrs. Cheever. Mr. Cheever sued for
the rents and defendant contended the Indiana divorce and the decree were invalid. The
Court held that a wife could acquire a domicile separate from her husband in the cir-
cumstances, that the Indiana court had jurisdiction and its decree, valid in Indiana, was
entitled to full faith and credit. Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582 (U.S. 1859), did not
decide full faith and credit issues.
5. CALHOUN, SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE AmERICAN FAmIY 47 (1918). "The courts
of Indiana were crowded with cases, whose movers were very often citizens of other
states, an evidence of the superior facilities there afforded." The Indiana situation is
mentioned also in COLE, THE IRREPRESSIBLE CONFLICT, 1850-1865 (1934) at 171, 172; and
in NEVINs, THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN A.MERICA, 1865-1878 (1927) at 216. Perhaps
the most important recent consideration of migratory divorce is the symposium in 2 LAw
AND CONTEMP. PROB. 289 (1935).
6. The territory of Utah between 1852 and 1878 required only that a plaintiff declare
his intent to reside in Utah. That territory seems to have become a divorce haven be-
tween 1875 and 1878. See III HowAD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS (1904)
131-133. "The legislation in Utah begins in 1852 with an act so faulty that its conse-
quences have become notorious in the divorce annals of the United States. A vicious
residence clause, coupled with a loose requirement regarding notice and an 'omnibus'
provision among the enumerated grounds of complaint became in effect a standing tempta-
tion to clandestine divorce seekers from outside the territory." Id. at 131. Nevada's rise
to fame dates from about 1900. The circumstances are described in Ingram and Ballard,
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An exchange of letters,- surely in no way remarkable in themselves, will
serve as a starting point for exposition, as it has for investigation:
Charles Tracy Law Office of
W. Howard Wait Tracy, Wait & Olmstead
Dwight H. Olmstead No. 18 William St.
New York Dec. 17, 1858
John B. Niles Esq.
LaPorte
Dear Sir
Under your easy code of divorce8 the hopes and fears of parties are
naturally excited. A case within my practice renders it important to
know what judge or which branch of your court (as to County)
holds the discretionary power of divorcing for grounds not enumer-
ated in the statute most liberally and which most strictly. Some
reputation or understanding on that point-as to the tendencies of
Judges & counties-must have grown up among the bar and suitors,
and my object now is to ask of you information in that regard. The
determination of a residence without your state may be materially
influenced by a right knowledge of the chances of attack & defence
in so important a matter.
Yours very truly
Chas. Tracy
LaPorte Decr. 24, 1858
Chas. Tracy Esq. N.Y.
Dr Sir
Yours of the 17th as rcd. Several of our Judges are much alike
in their actions in divorce cases & most of them grant divorces, under
the clause of the divorce law, in cases where there has been serious
fault on the part of the defendant [and] a reconciliation seems im-
possible.
Probably a divorce would be as readily obtained in this or the
Indianapolis circuit as any where. This circuit includes among
others: LaPorte & St. Joseph county (South Bend is seat of St.
Joseph). The divorce law has been such that Judges could not, in
most cases refuse divorce when the case was undefended as a
parties [sic] own affidavit was made prima facie evidence of resi-
dence.
I think a divorce could be as readily obtained in Indianapolis as
anywhere in the state.
Respy. Yours
J.B. Niles
The divorce law of the state is about to be essentially modified.
The Business of Migratory Divorce in Nevada, 2 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 302 (1935).
Illinois and Iowa may have been divorce centers in the mid-1800s. See note 51 infra. In
1910, it was asserted that North Dakota, South Dakota, and Rhode Island had long en-
joyed the reputation of divorce centers. Holbrook, Divorce Laws and the Increase of
Divorce, 8 MIcH. L. REV. 386, 392 (1940),
7. These letters are part of the collection of the law office papers of John Barron
Niles, a prominent Indiana lawyer who practiced in LaPorte from 1833 to 1879. The
collection is deposited with the Indiana University Library.
8. Ind. Rev. Stat. pt. II, c. 4, §§ 6-27 (1852).
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The statutory provision that excited the hopes and fears of Mr. Tracy's
client was the omnibus clause which concluded the section enumerating
grounds for divorce." At the end of a list including such typical grounds as
adultery, abandonment, and cruelty was this catch-all: "Any other cause for
which the court shall deem it proper that a divorce should be granted." This
clause was not new; it had been on the books since 1824 without provoking
recorded mass resort by outsiders to Indiana's courts. The truly significant sec-
tion, without which out-of-state divorce seekers would have found it impos-
sible to assert their grievances under the omnibus clause, was the new 1852
residence requirement, or rather the virtual lack of one."0  Bona fide resi-
dence in the county at the time of filing the petition was all that plaintiff need
show, and his own affidavit was prima facie evidence on the point. No other
state, and no territory but remote Utah, made escape by migration so easy.1
9. Id. § 7. A history of causes for divorce in Indiana prior to 1852 follows: The
1818 statute allowed either spouse full divorce for seven causes: adultery, matrimonial
incapacity, bigamous contract, two years' absence with intent to abandon, desertion and
living in adultery, conviction of felony; a wife could get divorce for husband's extremely
barbarous and inhuman treatment. Ind. Laws 1817-18, c. 35.- In 1824 an omnibus clause,
later to be much criticized, was added: A court could divorce in all cases when in its
discretion it deemed divorce proper. Ind. Rev. Laws 1824, c. 32. This clause
(slightly revised) was upheld in Ritter v. Ritter, 5 Blackf. 81 (Ind. 1889), against
the constitutional attack that it vested legislative power in the courts. In 1836,
was added a ground for the wife whose husband was for two years a habitual drunkard
and who failed "for any unreasonable length of time to make provision for his family."
Ind. Gen. :Laws 1836, c. 37. In the revision of 1838 the causes were set forth as adultery,
matrimonial incapacity, conviction of felony, husband's barbarity to wife, the omnibus
clause, habitual drunkenness by a husband who fails for an unreasonable time to provide
for his family, two years absence by a husband or wife with intent to abandon, "and also
for any other cause or causes." Ind. Rev. Stat. 1838, c. 31. The, "any other cause or
causes" was abandoned in 1843 and the clause regarding a husband's barbarity was modi-
fied to cruel or inhuman treatment or conduct towards his wife rendering it "unsafe and
improper for her to live with him." Ind. Rev. Stat. 1843, c. 35, § 40. In 1849 the period
of abandonment was reduced to one year or a lesser period where the court deemed
reconciliation hopeless. Ind. Gen. Laws 1849, c. 62.
10. Ind. Rev. Stat. 1852, pt. II, c. 4, § 6. A complete history of Indiana divorce legis-
lation to 1873 will be found in III HoWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS
(1904) at 115-118, 147, 154, 159, 160. Indiana's first statute allowing judicial divorce was
passed in 1818. It fixed no residence period. Ind. Laws 1817-18, c. 35. Twelve months
residence was required in 1831. Ind. Rev. Laws 1831, c. 31. This was increased to two
years by Ind. Rev. Stat. 1838, c. 31. In 1849 the requirement again fell to one year. Ind.
Gen. Laws 1848-9, c. 62. It may be worth mentioning here that the Indiana legislature
granted divorces until the 1851 Constitution forbade the practice. IND. CONST. Art. IV,
§ 22. According to HOWARD, op. cit. supra, 96-97, Indiana's legislature was "indiscreet"
in granting divorces, and adopted the practice of granting leave "to file bills in the
courts in cases where the prescribed cause for divorce by judicial power did not exist."
See Ind. Local Laws 1842, c. 117.
11. For Utah, see note 6 supra. A fairly complete history of the divorce legislation
of each state will be found in III HOWARD, op. cit. supra note 6, c. XVII. The statement
made about Indiana's preeminence in lax residence requirements is based upon the statu-
tory provisions set forth by Howard. All states but Indiana (and the territory of Utah)
seem to have required a period of residence by plaintiff or residence' of defendant, or
that the cause have occurred while the parties lived together in the state, or that the
marriage have been celebrated in the state, or that the cause relied upon have been a cause
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Rigid procedures could have been a countervailing force, of course, and
the statute did indeed require the prosecuting attorney's resistance to un-
defended petitions and did prohibit the rendition of decrees upon default with-
out proof.' 2 But non-resident service by publication" and the asserted apathy
of prosecutors and judges apparently undercut these safeguards. 4 Moreover,
the Indiana Supreme Court stauiped the seal of finality, at least within the
state, upon divorce decrees by holding that they could not be vacated or at-
tacked for any reason except upon regular motion for new trial." Sister states,
in the state where it occurred, or some combination of these provisions. It is worth re-
membering that sociologists take the position, apparently well supported by the statistics
of divorce, that civil divorce legislation has little to do with the rate or number of divorces.
Thus, though "the general trend of legislation and of administration in regard both to
marriage and divorce has been in direction of greater stringency[,]" the divorce rate has
greatly increased. LICHTENBERGER, DIVORCE 154 (1931). The subject of the effect of
law is discussed in Chapter Seven of this work. The author concludes by quoting with
approval WILLcOX, THE DIVORCE PROBLEm, A STUDY IN STATISTICS 55, 61 (1891), where
Willcox says: "It must be admitted that the influence of law, if not nil, is at least much
less than commonly supposed. . . . The conclusion of the whole matter is that law can do
little. .... [T]he immediate, direct and measurable influence of legislation is sub-
sidiary, unimportant, almost imperceptible." The only exception to this generalization
seems to be that rigid residence requirements do diminish migratory divorce. "[E]xcept
where migration in order to obtain divorces . . .was a dominant factor, . . . legislation
of this' [increased residence] sort may result in deferring or distributing divorces, but
. . . it has little or no effect in diminishing them." LICHTENBERGER, op. cit. supra, at 478.
12. Ind. Rev. Stat. pt. II, c. 4, §§ 27 and 13.
13. Id., § 11.
14. "The Divorce Law of Indiana has been made a great bugaboo of late in this and
other States, chiefly by the County Clerks in their anxiety for fees. I believe and
think I can prove to the satisfaction of any unprejudiced reasonable man that the Divorce
Law of our State is just what it should be. . . . Now what does this [bona fide residence]
section mean? Not that the court shall grant the diyorce, but that it may when the peti-
tion of a bona fide resident shall ask it. . . . [H]ow is a residency to be determined?
... [F]rom the evidence presented, being a question of fact which, like other questions
of the kind, can be arrived at generally from length of time in the country, occupation,
behavior, admissions, and fifty other things which would be brought to light if the prose-
cutor did his duty. . . How does the matter stand? Simply thus: that as we have a
good law that is not enforced owing to the neglect of State officers, we must repeal it
and pass one that they will carry out. A pretty cause for legislation is it not? ...Today
Attorneys would say, let the law stand, but make the officers do their duty. Show more
of the Brutus and Fitz Stephens character upon the bench-make a few examples-and
the laws of Indiana will be deservedly honored and revered, while those who undertake
to pervert their ends are paying her the penalty of their perjury in hard labor at the State
Prison." This letter, signed "Indiana Law," was printed in the Indianapolis Daily Journal,
Dec. 2, 1858, p.2, col.3. The same paper next day, p.2, col.1, carried an unsigned letter
whose author was called "one of our ablest and most prominent lawyers." The writer
said that "the Courts have been censured, but they are not to blame. They execute the
law as they find it; they have no power to make laws, and, so far as I have seen, the
Court requires strict proof of the causes of divorce, on hearing. [Italics added.] The
objection to our laws, grows out of the exparte proceedings, upon constructive notice .... "
The writer suggested that two years' continuous county residence be required. See also
note 45 infra.
15. Application for new trial was to be made at the term the decision was
rendered, except when causes for new trial were discovered after the term, in which case
motion could be made within one year, at most, of final judgment. Ind. Rev. Stat. 1852,
pt. II, c. 1, art. 18, §§ 354, 356. The case of McQuig v. McQuig, 13 Ind. 294 (1859),
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in the few cases found, did not treat Indiana judgments of divorce so
tenderly. 6
Reasons for Indiana's liberality are obscure. Horace Gre'eley, conven-
tional in his views of marriage and divorce, attributed the fact that the state
was "the paradise of free lovers" to "the lax principles of Robert Dale Owen
and the utter want of principle of John Pettit (leading reviser of the laws) ,"17
is extremely interesting both because of its holding and the impetus it may have given
to migratory divorces, and because the briefs of counsel are appended to the court's
opinion. These briefs throw light on the divorce situation in Indiana and on the law ofjurisdiction to divorce as then understood. The McQuigs lived in the state of New York.
The husband told witnesses that he could get no divorce in that state but that-he had
examined the laws of other states and that "Indiana was the easiest." He left his business
in temporary charge of another and spent some short time in Indianapolis, where he
divorced his wife in 1854.. She did not appear.. Three and one-half years later she filed
a complaint in Marion Circuit Court seeking to vacate the judgment because it was
fraudulently procured in that her husband had never been a bona fide resident of Indiana.
The trial court charged the jury that domicile was necessary to divorce and also left it
to them to determine whether the husband had ever acquired the bona fide residence
required by statute. The jury found for the wife. Appellant contended that domicile
and residence were not identical and that Indiana required only residence, that the court
must necessarily have passed upon the bona fides of the husband's residence and that this
concluded the parties as res judicata, and that the Indiana statutes prohibited re-opening
of divorce decrees. Appellee contended that the decree was void for two distinct reasons:
because it was obtained by a fraud on the wife and the court, since the husband was not
a bona fide resident as required; and because the divorcing court had no jurisdiction unless
the husband was a bona fide resident. The statute relied upon by the husband, providing
for the vacating of judgments and excepting divorce judgments, was said not to supersede
the old chancery bill to vacate for fraud. The wife's brief closes with this peroration:"
"And the settlement of the case in accordance with principle, will certainly convey a
salutary lesson to that large class of discontented or lecherous pilgrims seeking the Mecca
of divorce, who turn their faces toward Indiana, as the happy region where the judgment
they wish can be obtained the most easily and the most cheaply." The court held that the
statute provided the only procedures for vacating judgments and by its terms excluded
divorces. Hence; a divorce decree could be attacked only on motion for a new trial. The
case was overruled by Earle v. Earle, 91 Ind. 27, 37 (1883) ; and see Powell v. Powell,
10.4 Ind. 28, 33 (1885).
16. McGiffert v. McGiffert, 31 Barb. 69 (N.Y. 1859) ; the "Millspaugh Case," dis-
cussed at length in the Indiana Daily State Sentinel, Jan. 30, 1865, p. 2, col. 2, in which a
New York judge held an Indiana divorce under the 1859 statute void because plaintiff
had not resided the required year in Indiana; a news report of. a Kentucky court's holding
an Indiana divorce void in Kentucky, Indiana Daily State Sentinel, April 23, 1861. (f.
Hawkins v. Ragsdale, 80 Ky. 343 (1882). "One of [Indiana's] ablest and most prominent
lawyers," see note 14 supra, gave it as the "better opinion . . . that if our law has been
strictly complied with, and, that appears on the face of the record so as to make the pro-
ceedings valid on error here, they are valid everywhere."
17. The Greeley-Owen debate was conducted in the columns of the New York Trib-
une between March 1, 1860, when Greeley made the charge quoted here, till April 31,
1860. It is reprinted in GREELEY, REcOLLEcTiONs OF A Busy LIFE 571-618 (1869). An-
other quotation from the initial Greeley charge is of interest: "A legal friend of mine
in that State [Indiana] recently remarked to us, that, at one County Court, he obtained
eleven divorces one day before dinner; 'and it wasn't a good morning for divorces either.'
In one case within his knowledge, a prominent citizen of an eastern manufacturing city
came to Indiana, went through the usual'routine, obtained his divorce about dinner time
and, in the course of the evening was married to his new inamorata, who had come on for
the purpose and was staying at the same hotel with him. They soon started" for home,
having no more use for the State of Indiana; and, on arriving he- introduced his new
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
and this view occasionally finds currency in modern works. 8 Owen, chairman
of the joint committee on the 1852 revision," repudiated the charge that he
was responsible for the "state of law which enables men or women to get un-
married nearly at pleasure. 2  Probably his erroneous statement that the
152 revision left the old law "with all its essential features the same"'" re-
flects a lapse of memory and is evidence that there had been an accident in
drafting, rather than that the revisors had deliberately deceived the legislature.
The accident theory was current in Indiana at the time when the evil was
attracting most attention.
2 2
Influences generally thought to be productive of liberal divorce attitudes
and of greater willingness to resort to the law for dissolution of marriage
were doubtless strong in Indiana. A Protestant people,22 too recently frontiers-
wife to her astonished predecessor, whom he notified that she must pack up and go, as
there was no room for her in that house any longer. So she went."
There is no indication that the charge against Pettit was true. The "want of prin-
ciple" alleged is probably based upon Pettit's "hatred of Christianity." He must have
gained national notoriety when, as a member of the United States House of Representa-
tives in 1847, he objected to the appointment of a chaplain. See I DuNN, INDIANA AND
INDIANANS 449-450 (1919). See the statement of Owen, note 21 infra.
18. Owen's responsibility is asserted in Robert Dale Owen in XIV DICrIONARY OF
AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 119 (Malone ed. 1934). It is denied in LEOPOLD, ROBERT DALE
OWEN 155 (1940).
19. The official records do not show Owen as chairman. I Journal of the House of
Representatives, 36th Sess. 1851, 1183, 12.12-1216 (1851). But see LEOPOLD, op. cit. supra
*note 18, at 288.
20. The language is Greeley's. New York Tribune, March 1, 1860; GREELEY, Op. Cit.
supra note 17, at 570.
21. Owen in New York Tribune, March 5, 1860; GREELEY op. cit. r upra note 17, at
573-574. "So far as I recollect, the Indiana law of divorce does not owe a single section
to Mr. Pettit. Be that, however, as it may, it owes one of its provisions, and one only,
to me. I found that law thirty-four years ago, when I first became a resident of the
State, in substance nearly what it now is; indeed, with all its essential features the same.
It was once referred to myself, in conjunction with another member of the Legislature,
for revision; and we amended it in a single point; namely, by adding to the causes *of
divorce 'habitual drunkenness for two years.' In no other particular, either by vote or
proposition, have I been instrumental in framing or amending the law in question, directly
or indirectly."
22. The Indianapolis Daily Journal, March 9, 1860, p. 2, col. 2, speaking of the omni-
bus clause empowering a court to divorce for any cause said: "We say it is a shame
to our State and the real shame is in it, and not in the accident that a carelessly worded
provision gave t*he whole Union a chance to be divorced here, and flooded our courts with
the abominations of half the dishonored homes on the continent." An earlier letter,
published in the Indiana Daily Journal, Dec. 2, 1858, p. 2, col. 3, apparently written by a
lawyer and signed "Indiana Law" took the position that the 1852 statute was good but
badly enforced. "I would call especial attention to the care with which this section
[6, requiring bona fide residence] was drawn by the Legislature of 1852. They seem to
have put on all of the additional safeguards-that none but the citizens of the State should
enjoy the benefit of this act. They do not only require an 'affidavit of mere residency,
but a bona fide residence."
23. The 1850 census data give a measure of the comparative strength of Catholicism
and Protestantism in Indiana. There were in that year 709,655 members of 2032 churches
which owned property evaluated at $1,529,585. Roman Catholic churches numbered
63 of these, their members 25,115, their property $167,725. By comparison there were
778 Methodist churches,. with 266,372 members, worth $492,560. Baptist: 428 churches,
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men to have lost their individualism 24 yet possibly already feeling the nascent
effects of industrialism with its new pressures and it weakening of the family, 5
might be expected to adopt freer divorce laws. Owen's vigorous espousal of
the rights of women 26 could not have failed to have its effect, and increased
divorce seems a concomitant of the modern rise in the status of women. Too,
the westward movement left in its wake deserted wives with a strong claim on
public sympathy.27 But none of these influences and no combination of them
can have been so peculiarly operative in Indiana as to account for its peculiar
residence law. The accident theory, therefore, while not thoroughly satis-
factory, carries a good deal of conviction.
Whatever its origins, the law's potentialities did not long remain un-
realized. By 1857, the influx of divorce seekers had reached a volume suf-
ficient to impel Governor Wright to advert to the problem in his message to the
legislature and to recommend the passage of a two-year residence require-
ment to "relieve our Courts from the pressure of applications for divorce...
on the part of citizens of' other States. '28  Any accurate appraisal of the
intensity of this pressure would require detailed data, especially since migra-
tory divorces today attract public attention to an extent greatly disproportion-
ate to their relatively small numbers, and a similar exaggeration may have pre-
vailed in the 1850s.20 Yet, the few facts available suggest at least that migra-
138,783 members, $212,735 evaluation. Presbyterian: 282 churches, 105,582 members,
$326,520 evaluation. SEVENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1850, 799-807 (1853).
Other sects larger than the Roman church were Christian and Friends. The importance
of a Roman Catholic population as a factor minimizing divorce is mentioned in SPECIAL
REPORTS OF THE CENSUS OFFICE, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 1867-1906, Pt. I, 14 (1909). See
also LICHTENBERGER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 107, 211, 312, "Where Catholic ihfluence in
the population is strong the divorce rate is correspondingly low."
24. See 2 CALHOUN, op. cit. supra note 5, c. 1 and 2.
25. Changes in material culture and consequently in attitudes toward women, mar-
riage, and divorce are thoroughly discussed in LICHTENBERGER, op. cit. supra note 11, c.
XI-XVI.
26. See LEOPOLD, op. cit. supra note 18, passim, esp. c. XVII. Owen's views on women
and their rights may be read in I and II DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION
FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA, 1850. The subject is
indexed in those volumes under "Rights-of married women."
27. See Ind. Laws, 1857, c. XLV, "An act to vest certain rights in married women
whose husbands have left the State without making suitable provisions for their main-
tenance. . . ." "The majority of the divorces were granted at the request of the wife.
The step was often in consequence of the husband's abandoning her to seek his fortune
in California where the thirst for gold lured.? 2 CALHOUN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 47.
28. DOCUMENTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF INDIANA AT THE THIRTY-NINTH
SESSION, Pt. I, 302 (1857).
29. LICHTENBERGER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 180, 206-207. "Proofs.have been ad-
vanced to show that the importance of migratory divorces is exaggerated very greatly.
It is believed that probably not over 3 per cent are of this sort." Cavers thought 5% a
"liberal estimate" in 1937. Cavers, Migratory Divorce, 16 SocIAL FORCES 96, 106 (1937).
These statements refer to the nation as a whole, of course. The importance of migratory
divorce today in Nevada may be seen in the rate of divorce per 1000 population in Nevada.
Random recent years are 1940, 46.3; 1943, 85.9; 1946, 136.4; 1949, 67.9. By comparison,
the rate for Indiana in 1940 (the last year for which the figure is available) was 2.5. The
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tory divorces were numerous indeed. An editorial in the Indianapolis Daily
Journal in 1858 protested that of seventy-two divorce actions pending at the be-
ginning of the then current term of the Marion County Court, "more than
fifty were brought by non-residents."3 0  A study of the records and papers
from John Bafron Niles' LaPorte law office between 1858 and 1866 indicates
that of the twenty-two divorces he handled (4% of his total practice), seven-
teen involved plaintiffs who had come to Indiana probably only to obtain
divorces. Of these seventeen, five came from New York, three Pennsylvania,
two Massachusetts and Illinois, one California, Connecticut, Michigan, Ohio,
and Wisconsin.3
With one terminus of the typical migration route suggested by the Niles
papers, the other is described.by a newspaper editorial.8 2 "Tippecanoe, Floyd,
Jefferson, Allen, LaPorte, every county where a railroad or large population
affoirds good facilities for speedy coming and going, and comfortable hiding,
is full of divorce hunting men and women, though, so far as we have noticed,
the women outnumber the men, two to one."
The public reception accorded Governor Wright's message seems to have
been far more favorable than that given the divorce seekers. The Indianapolis
Daily Journal, in one of several jeremiads, purported to speak for the people
in passing this illiberal judgment on the foreign applicants:" "[W]e are
overrun by a flock of ill-used, and ill-using, petulant, libidinous, extravagant,
ill-fitting husbands and wives as a sink is overrun with the foul water of the
whole house. . . . [N]ine out of every ten have no better cause of divorce
than their own depraved appetites. . . ." An Indiana judge is reported to
have indicated his subscription to this Victorian view in a similar statement.8 4
The humiliation of national notoriety probably was responsible for much of
the acerbity of such indictments.85
rate for other states in the Union seldom rises above 4 for any of the years mentioned here.
36 FSA, SUMMARY OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE STATISTICS, UNITED STATES, 1949 (June
5, 1951) 22-23.
30. Dec. 11, 1858, p. 2, col. 2.
31. These data are the result of research in the Niles collection by Ellis B. Anderson
in a seminar in American Legal History at the Indiana University School of Law, 1951.
I am indebted to him too for finding the exchange of correspondence set forth at the
outset of this paper.
32. Indianapolis Daily Journal, Dec. 3, 1858, p. 2, col. 1.
33. Ibid. See also editorials in the Journal, Dec. 11, 1852, p. 2, col. 2; Dec. 18, 1858,
p. 2, col. 1; March 9, 1860, p. 2, col. 2. See also the appeal made by a divorced wife's
counsel in the brief of McQuig v. McQuig, note 15 supra. Cf. the defense of the immi-
grants as "good citizens" who seek to "shake off the drag of their life" without the pub-
licity of legislative divorce at home. Letter in The Indianapolis Daily Journal, Dec. 2,
1858, p. 2, col. 3.
34. "The advocates of free love could not ask a statute more favorable to their
views . . . the polygamy of the Mormons was preferable; for it at least obliged hus-
bands to provide for the subsistence and protection of their wives." Quoted without
citation of authority in 2 CALHOUN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 47.
35. See, for example, the article in the Detroit Free Press captioned "Miss .udson
Goes to Indiana and Gets a Divorce" reprinted in the Indiana Daily State Sentinel, Feb.
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Legislative response to the governor's appeal was immediate but, during
the 1857 and the special 1858 sessions, ineffectual, apparently because each
chamber insisted upon its own bill in preference to the other's.386 In 1859,the
first Senate bill concerned the divorce law, but it was a House bill that finally
became law. The new statute required: residence in the county and one year's
residence in the state at the time of filing the petition, such residence to be
proved to the court's satisfaction. A tardy attempt to mitigate the evils of
past laxity found expression in a provision permitting defendants served only
by publication to set aside within two years those parts of a divorce decree
dealing with alimony, property disposition, and custody:
7
Now came the test of the charge, heard occasionally prior to 1859, that
not bad law but bad judicial administration was the root of Indiana'sprob-
lem. 8  For a fev years during the Civil War, and perhaps because of it, the
absence of public utterance suggests a conviction that the problem had been
solved. Suspiciously though, as early, as 1861 and agairi in 1863 the House
of Representatives had before it bills to amend the residence requirements for
19, 1859, p. 2, col. 3. Miss Judson's case attracted wide attention; she had married a
Negro and was now seeking a divorce from him.
36. In 1857 the House passed H.R. 70 to amend the section on residence and cause
(and two other sections) and therefore indefinitely postponed consideration of H.R. 85
dealing with the same problems. The Senate passed H.R. 70 with sundry amendments,
including an emergency clause. The House refused to concur in several unspecified
Senate amendments and the bill died. Journal of the House of Representatives, 39th
Sess., 178, 201-2, 231, 837 (1857). Regarding H.R. 85, Id. at 201, 215, 520. Journal of
the Senate, 39th Sess., 387-388 (1857). The Senate passed S. 13 to amend the residence
requirement to one year, alter the omnibus clause to read "any other cause in fraud of
the marriage contract, occurring previous to the marriage," and to lengthen the period
of abandonment which would constitute cause for divorce. Jourhal of the Senate, 39th
Sess., 81, 90-91, 141-2, 281-3 (1857). The House laid the bill on the table and it was
never taken up. Journal of the House of Representatives, 39th Sess., 963 (1857).o In
the Special Session of 1858, H.R. 5, to amend the residence section and repeal the omnibus
clause, passed after an unsuccessful attempt was made so to amend it as to prevent divorce
in Indiana for any cause. Journal of the House of Representatives, Spec. Sess., 31, 64,
150-2, 183 (1858). The Senate amended it, apparently leaving the omnibus clause as law
and adding provisions to allow divorce decrees to be vacated for some purposes. The
House took no further action when the bill was returned to it.. Journal of the Senate,
Spec. Sess., 301-5 .(1858). A Senate bill, S. 4, passed second reading dtring the special
session, but the absence of an index in the journal for this session makes attempt to trace
it impracticable. I BREVIER LEGiSLATIVE REPORTS 25-6 (Nov. 30, 1858)..
37. H.R. 93 became Ind. Laws 1859, c. XL. It contained an emergency clause with
the recital that "advantage is daily taken of the existing law by non-resident parties, who
are not entitled to divorce." Its legislative history may be traced in Journal of the House
of Representatives, 40th Sess., 149, 170, 409, 491, 739-40, 851-2, 873, 961, 998, 1056 (1859)
and in Journal of the Senate, 40th Sess., 506-9, 694, 790, 837-8, 963-4 (1859).., The House
tabled another divorce bill, H.R. 76. Journal of the House of Representatives, 40th
Sess., 135, 166, 410 (1859). S: 1 was tabled by the House because H.R. 93 had already
passed. Id. at 502. Its passage through the Senate is to be found in Journal of the Senate,
40th Sess., 41, 157-9, 209-211, 250, 253-4 (1859).
. 38. See note 14 supra.
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divorce.3 9 By 1865 there could be no doubt. Two bills to prevent migratory
divorces were introduced in the Senate, one by Niles.40 A further measure was
introduced to amend Indiana's practice act under which by agreement of coun-
sel the issues in a case could be referred by the court to a referee, probably
always of counsels' selection. In support of a provision to regulate such refer-
ence Senator Brown described the organization on the Atlantic seaboard of
mercantile businesses whose stock in trade was the Indiana divorce. Fraudu-
lent affidavits of plaintiffs and falsified retainers purporting to come from
defendants were placed in the hands of conniving Indiana lawyers. These men
referred the issues to,a third lawyer selected by them to further their fraud
and to avoid judicial examination of- the case, and the court accepted the
referee's findings without question. This device produced "hundreds of
divorces . . . in the courts of this state annually by non-residents, and in no
case [were] the defendants probably . . . aware of the fact until long after
the same [had been] procured."
39. H.R. 97 to amend the residence and cause sections, Journal of the House of
Representatives, 41st Sess., 174, 309, 359, 746-7, 1043 (1861). H.R. 70 to amend the resi-
dence section, Journal of the House of Representatives, 43rd Sess., 133, 189, 369, 461
(1863).
40. S. 108, Niles' bill, concerned bona fide residence. It passed the Senate but was
lost in the House. Journal of the Senate, 44th Sess., 186, 223, 345,, 395 (1865) ; Journal
of the House of Representatives, 44th Sess., 532 (1865). The content of the bill is
nowhere stated in detail. S. 268, to prescribe the terms for divorces where causes accrued
outside the state, met the same fate as Niles' bill, at the f865 Special Session. Journal of
the Senate, Spec. Sess., 233, 255, 267-268, 311 (1865) ; Journal of the House of Represen-
tatives, Spec. Sess., 374 (1865).
41. "Agencies are established in New York and other Eastern cities, which advertise
to procure divorces for any parties desiring same, whether cause exist therefor or not.
These agencies have lawyers in this state to whom they send the cases, at the same time
forging the name of the defendant to a written retainer which, with a. fee, they send to
another attorney, in the entire confidence of the thing. These two attorneys enter our
Courts, procure the referment of the case to a third attorney, also in the confidence of
the matter, who has his fee in the case, and who reports in favor of a divorce without
ever receiving or examining any evidence in the case whatever. . . . Upon this report
of the referee it would seem, the courts have no discretion but to grant the divorce."
VII BRxvimR LEGISLATIVE REPORTS 110 (1865). The speech was addressed to a bill to
amend Ind. Rev. Stat. 1852, pt. II, c. 1, art. 18, § 349 which provided that, "all or any of
the issues in the action whether of fact or of law, or both, may be referred, upon the
written consent of the parties." The bill's (S. 16) contents cannot be determined; hence
possible subsequent attempts to enact similar bills cannot be traced. It passed the Senate,
was recommended for passage by the House Judiciary Committee, but was immediately
and permanently tabled in that body. Journal of the Senate, 44th Sess., 36, 47, 104, 140,
155 (1865) ; Journal of the House of Representatives, 44th Sess., 182, 274, 478 (1865).
Concerning defendants' unawareness of pendency of suit, compare with Brown's
statement a similar charge made by Senator Church in support of S.147 in 1867: "Ninety-
nine out of one hundred divorces obtained in this state would never be granted if the de-
fendants knew of their pendency and could get here to make their plea." IX BREVIER
LEGISLATIVE REPORTS 231 (Feb. 14, 1867). The following advertisement appeared in The
New York Weekly Tribune, Dec. 22, 1869, p. 8, col. 4: "Divorces obtained in New York,
Connecticut, Indiana and Illinois. Legal everywhere. No charge in advance; Advice
free. Address M. House, Counselor, 78 Nassau St., N. Y." Compare Bergeson, The
Divorce Mill Advertises, 2 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 348 (1935) for the present practice.
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This is the only explicit reference to the possibility that any elements of
the Indiana bar or business community were exploiting the statutes ;41a and as
Brown's bill failed of passage it may perhaps be a fair inference that legisla-
tors did not attribute the divorce situation to the practice so luridly described.
Government statistics, available from 1867 on,42 hardly support Senator
Brown's picture of the magnitude of immigration," b'ut the assembly con-
sidered the divorcing of foreigners sufficiently frequent to merit the introduc-
tion of ten more bills through the 1869 session.44  In 1871 Governor Conrad
Baker devoted a sizeable portion of his message to the assembly to a review
of the state's divorce laws, and his speech gives credibility to part at least of
Brown's statement of the practices prevailing.4 5 " [W] e might well hope that
Indiana divorces would soon cease to be advertised in any of the Atlantic cities,
and that refugees and fugitives from the justice of other States would no
longer come to Indiana in quest of divorces to be used on their return to their
homes as licenses to violate the laws of our sister states.1
46
41a. The business possibilities were of course recognized. See, e.g., Senator Murray's
(Cass, Howard, Pulaski Counties) remark in debate on S.1 in 1859: "He was standing
up against his own individual interest as a lawyer, when he advocated an amendment of
the divorce law." II BREVIER LEGISLATIVE REPORTS 62 (Jan. 23, 1859). The potential
role of the business community in securing the adoption or perpetuation of lax divorce
legislation is illustrated by the situation in Nevada. See Ingram and Ballard, The Business
of Migratory Dihorce in Nevada, 2 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 302 (1935), and Bergeson,
The Divorce Mill Advertises, Id. at 348.
42. See SPECIAL REPORTS OF THE CENSUS OFFICE, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 1867-1906
(1909). The inception of these reports, now kept up to date annually, is detailed in
LICHTENBERGER, op. cit. supra note 11, pp. 100-103.
43. See the statistics, note 50 infra.
44. House bills were H.R. 264 in the Special Session 6f 1865; H.R. 88, 270, 325 in the
1867 session; H.R. 204 in 1869; H.R. 360, 363, 378 in the 1869 Special Session. The
committee report on H.R. 378 recommends passage with the familiar phrases "in order that
the character of our State may be cleansed from the odium now attached to it" and "that
the marriage relation may be rendered in some measure more secure against . . . avarice,
perfidy, and brutality. . . ." Journal of the House of Representatives, Spec. Sess., 516
(1869). Senate bills were S. 88 (possibly not relevant to migratory divorce) and S. 147
in the 1867 session. More particular citation to pages of the House and Senate Journals
sdems unnecessary for most of these bills.
45. "The laws of this State regulating the granting of divorce, and especially the lax
manner in which they have been administered in some of our courts, has given Indiana
a notoriety that is by no means enviable." The Governor censured the omnibus clause,
then passed to immigration for divorce purposes. His description of the manner in which
non-residents obtain divorces leaves in doubt how substantial was the compliance with
the one-year residence requirement. After referring to people who came to stay only
for a year, he speaks of the maintenance of "the appearance of a residence." Touching
upon the stigma attaching to Indiana in other states and the disrespect into which law was
falling among Indiana citizens who witnessed the evasions practiced, Governor Baker
recommended amendment in the following respects: repealing the omnibus clause, changing
the cause for cruel treatment to cruel and inhuman treatment, reqiiring that resident
defendants be sued in the county of their residence, requiring that the one year's residence
prior to filing must then continue till the case be tried, prohibiting divorce where the
cause occurred out of state unless the facts constituted a cause where they occurred,
requiring particularity in affidavit and that residence and place of cause be proved on trial.
Journal of the Senate, 47th Sess., 59-62 (1871).
46. Id. at 62.
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The response to the governor's message was again gratifying, although
there was a two year time lag before one of the twenty bills introduced finally
became law in 1873.11 More important, one suspects, than the law's two years'
residence provision was the requirement that proof of such residence be set
forth in petitioner's detailed affidavit and established on the testimony of two
resident freehold witnesses. Similarly remedial were the abolition of the
omnibus clause; attempts to give more effective notice; and a provision that
within two years, during which plaintiff could not remarry, defendant
could move to vacate the judgment of divorce itself (and not merely of ali-
mony, property disposition, and custody).
The efficacy of the statute, the basis of the law today, in erecting pro-
tective barriers along Indiana's boundaries can probably be gauged accurately
from the fact that reform agitation subsided after 1873. Statistics of the
Bureau of the Census likewise are suggestive, although they are pregnant with
imponderables and therefore not as decisive as might be hoped.4" From
1867 through 1872, when Indiana was granting about ten per cent of the na-
tion's divorces,49 the annual number of divorces in Indiana varied between
1096 and 1210. In 1873 the number dropped to 864 and by 1878 had risen
only to 1183. In the United States as a whole, however, the number of
divorces indicated a steady rise between 1867 and 1878 from 9937 to 16,089.50
In the number of divorces dissolving marriages celebrated elsewhere than in
the divorcing state (which includes but is by no means confined to migratory
divorces) Indiana fell from first in the nation between 1c'67 through 1871 to
fourth during the next five year period, and seventh in the next." Most
47. House bills were H.R. 15, 16, 31, 98, 351 in 1871; H.R. 23 in the 1872 Special
Session; H.R. 21, 23, 85, 141, 331, 514 in 1873. Senate Bills were S. 8, 100 in 1871'; S. 19,
117, 154 in the 1872 Special Session; S. 19, 154, 339 in 1873. Citation to the history of
these bills can be very incomplete at best; since it can serve little purpose it is omitted.
See the Journals, which are poorly indexed. It will be noted that, contrary to modern
custom, bills introduced at a Special Session did not die at the adjournment of the Special
Session but were also set down on the calendar of the next regular session. In accordance
with present-day practice these bills are here reckonied as separate bills. The statute is
Ind. Laws 1873, c. XLIII, §§ 6-28. An interestirg debate on the need for greater strin-
gency in the law is to be found in letters to The Indiana Journal, Jan. 10 (p. 2, col. 4),
14 (p. 3, col. 2), and 18 (p. 3, col. 2), 1871.
48. The danger in looking to the divorce statistics of only one state in an effort to
draw conclusions about the efficacy of law are well illustrated in LIcHTEBRGER, op.
cit. supra note 11, c. 7.
49. Of 53,574 United States divorces from 1867 through 1871, 5,741 were Indiana's.
SPECIAL REPORT OF TIlE CENSUS OFFICE, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 1867-1906, Pt. II, 4
(1909).
50. In the following chronological list, the number of Indiana divorces appears
first, followed by the number for the entire United States: 1867: 1096, 9937; 1868: 1126,
10,150; 1869: 1210, 10,939; 1870: 1170, 10,962; 1871: 1139, 11,586; 1872: 1157, 12,390;
1873: 864, 13,156; 1874: 1002, 13,989; 1875: 1052, 14,212; 1876: 1014, 14,800; 1877: 1151,
15,687; 1878.: 1183, 16,089; 1879: 1271, 17,083; 1880: 1423, 19,663. SPECIAL REPORTS OF
THE CENSUS OFFICE,. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 1867-1906, Pt. I, 64-65 (1909).
51. The use of these data as an index to Indiana's importance as a center of migratory
divorce is fraught with danger. The American people are highly mobile; in 1880,
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convincing of all, between Kf87 and 1906 Indiana was seventh from the top
among states whose divorces were directed against defendants residing in the
divorcing state. 52 Indiana's heyday as a divorce mill was over.
22.1 per cent of all native born persons were living in states other than their birthplaces,
presumably for reasons unconnected with any desire to obtain divorces. Assuming- that
this figure, 22.1 per cent, can be projected backwards in time to the period of 1867, i.e., that
it remained constant between 1867 and 1880 (and remembering that it includes all persons,
infant, unmarried, etc., and is theref6re not strictly comparable with figures taking
account only of the movement of married people), it may be revealing to note the number
of Indiana divorces dissolving Indiana marriages compared to the number dissolving
foreign marriages. 1867 through 1871: Indiana marriages 3,550; other state marriages
1,135; marriages of unknown origin 1,021. 1872 through 1876: Indiana marriages 3,572;
other state marriages 817; marriages of unknown origin 665. 1877 through 1881: Indiana
marriages 4,985; other state marriages 896; marriages of unknown origin 604. In the
1867-1871 interval, Indiana granted a higher mnmber of divorces to plaintiffs whose mar-
riages had been celebrated elsewhere than did any other state. Illinois and Iowa were not
far behind however. And Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, and Wisconsin all dissolved
at least 400 known foreign marriages, for a ratio of divorce of foreign marriage higher
than or as high as Indiana's. Ranking higher than Indiana in the number of divorces
dissolving foreign marriages from 1872 through 1876 were Illinois, Iowa, and Utah.
These states plus California, Michigan, and Ohio exceeded Indiana for 1877-1881. Many
western states exceeded Indiana in the percentage of divorces of foreign marriage for the
last period, but the fact that they were states recently settled would seem to render this
fact of no reliable significance for present purposes. The problem involved in using these
data as the basis for conclusions concerning the volume of migratory divorces is explained
in LICHTENBERGER op. cit. supra note 11, at 179-80. The data may be found in SPECIAL
REPORTS OF THE CENSUS OFFICE, MARRIAGE AND DivORcE 1867-1906, Pt. II, 697-698
(1909). Causes alleged as grounds for Indiana divorces will be found in the same work
at 99, number of divorces by counties at 755.
52. Id., Pt. I at 33. Interestingly, Indiana's rank in the nation for number of
divorces per 100,000 population rose from thirteenth in 1880. to fifth in 1890 to fourth
in 1900. Id. at 16.
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